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Dunia P. Zongwe

Itula and Others v Minister of Urban and Rural Development and Others
2020 (1) NR 86 (SC)
By
Dunia P. Zongwe 1

At the heart of this electoral case lies deep questions about what it means exactly to ‘know’
something and about a few steps that judges should avoid when reasoning from unknowns. In
short, the court refused to cancel a presidential election because those who challenged that
election in court failed to prove that the absence of verifiable paper trail changed the outcome
of the election. If a judge lacks evidence of any claim put forth by the parties, they cannot lean
on the absence of evidence to arrive at any conclusion, except to conclude that they do not
know whether the claim conveys the truth. Likewise, if an election body cannot verify the
votes, a judge cannot maintain that people should trust that election or those votes. Another
way of saying that absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.

So how should the Supreme Court have handled the absence of paper trail in the Itula case?
The court rejected the applicants’ request that the court invalidate the election, but jurists will
discover that this rejection defies logic and science itself. And this commentary shows how.

The facts
This case concerns the latest presidential election in Namibia, which took place on
27 November 2019 amidst a sagging economy and a fresh corruption scandal brewing in the
fisheries sector. The incumbent and candidate of the ruling party, Dr. Hage Gottfried Geingob,
won the election, but with the lowest majority that the ruling South West Africa People’s
Organization (SWAPO) has ever managed to garner since independence. 2 As a consequence,
SWAPO lost its super-majority in the main house of Parliament. 3 Independent candidate Dr.
Panduleni Itula came second and managed to win as much as 38% of the vote. Namibia resorted
to electronic voting machines (EVMs).

1

Associate Professor, Department of Legal Studies, Walter Sisulu University. J.S.D. (Cornell); LL.M. (Cornell);
Cert. (Univ. Montréal); LL.B. (Univ. Namibia); B.Juris (Univ. Namibia).
2
See also Henning Melber, ‘Namibia’s Parliamentary and Presidential Elections: The Honeymoon Is Over’ (2020)
109 The Round Table 13, 19 (noting that, for the first time since 1990, SWAPO’s presidential candidate earned
less votes than the ruling party itself).
3
In other words, SWAPO lost its two-thirds majority in the National Assembly.
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However, an issue arose, partly because the applicants alleged irregularities in the use of these
EVMs, but mostly because the Electoral Commission of Namibia (ECN) used the EVMs
without a paper trail to verify the votes. Itula and representatives of opposition parties
(hereinafter referred to as ‘the applicants’) sued the Minister of Urban and Rural Development
(hereinafter the ‘Minister’), and the ECN, among other respondents, 4 for the way the general
elections were conducted. In particular, Itula and the other applicants applied to the Supreme
Court of Namibia to challenge the constitutionality of the action by the Minister, who had
‘selectively promulgated’ the provisions of section 97 of the Electoral Act 5 of 2014 (or the
‘Act’). 5 To remedy the alleged unconstitutionality of the Minister’s action, the applicants asked
the Court for declaratory orders that included setting aside the 2019 presidential election and
directing a rerun of that election without undue delay.

Section 97 authorized the election body to use EVMs during elections, but sub-sections 97(3)
and (4) subjected the use of EVMs to a verifiable paper trail. When the Minister brought the
Act into operation, he excluded those two sub-sections, 6 making it possible for the election
body to resort to EVMS during the 2019 election but without any paper trail to verify the votes.

The parties’ arguments
The applicants submitted that the Minister’s ‘selective promulgation’ violated the
constitutional principle of separation of powers. 7 They also contended that the selective
promulgation trampled on certain democratic principles under Articles 44, 8 56, 9 and 94B 10 of
the Constitution. 11 They further complained that the EVMs malfunctioned and alleged several
irregularities during the 2019 election. 12

The respondents countered the applicants’ submissions with several preliminary points. They
disputed the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to hear the matter as a court of first and final

4

The 29 respondents in this matter comprised the Minister of Urban and Rural Development, the Attorney-General
of Namibia, the Electoral Commission of Namibia, the Chairperson of the Electoral Commission of Namibia, and
the President of the Republic of Namibia.
5
Itula and Others v Minister of Urban and Rural Development and Others 2020 (1) NR 86 (SC) [8].
6
ibid.
7
ibid.
8
On legislative powers.
9
On assents to bills.
10
On the ECN.
11
Itula (n 5) [8].
12
ibid [9].
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instance 13 and they accordingly claimed that the applicants should have approached the High
Court of Namibia before the ECN organized the 2019 presidential election. The respondents
also submitted that the applicants delayed their decision to launch the proceedings and that the
applicants should have commenced suit within a reasonable time after the Minister selectively
brought the Electoral Act into force. 14 Furthermore, they denied the irregularities alleged by
the applicants. 15

Interestingly, the respondents relied on an earlier High Court ruling on EVMs. In that case, the
High Court dismissed a claim that called into question the lawfulness of elections and byelections held in 2014 in which the ECN utilized EVMs without a paper trail. 16 The respondents
in Itula thus argued that the High Court ruling binds the Supreme Court and made it lawful for
the ECN to use EVMs without paper trail.

The Supreme Court’s holdings
With respect to the respondents’ objection to the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction, the court held
that it could hear the challenge brought by the applicants because the legislature intended the
phrase ‘any challenge’ in section 172(1) of the Electoral Act to have a wide meaning. 17 In
addition, the court considered the country’s constitutional democracy and its history to
conclude that it had to interpret section 172(1) broadly and purposively. 18

The Supreme Court agreed with the respondents that the applicants delayed in raising the issue
of EVMs without paper trail, but it condoned the delay because the applicants raised “an issue
of profound constitutional importance” and because their challenge had sound merits. 19 The
court therefore found that the condonation of the applicants’ delay served the interest of
justice. 20

The Court ruled for the applicants when it concluded that the Minister breached the
constitutional principle of separation of powers. The court held that section 97(3) and 97(4)

13

ibid [22]
ibid [23].
15
ibid [25].
16
Maletzky and Others v Electoral Commission of Namibia and Others 2015 (2) NR 571 (HC).
17
See Itula (n 5) [44], read with [46].
18
ibid [44].
19
ibid [61].
20
ibid.
14
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condition the operation of sections 97(1) and 97(2) (which authorizes the ECN to use the
EVMs) on compliance with sections 97(3) and 97(4) (which subjects the use of EVMs to a
verifiable paper trail). 21 In light of this, the Minister’s selective implementation exceeded the
Minister’s powers under section 209 to selectively put in force the power to use EVMs. 22 The
Court ruled that, in selectively implementing section 97, the Minister “effectively deleted (for
the time being) the safeguards enacted by Parliament”, thereby usurping Parliament’s role and
breaching the separation of powers provided for in the Constitution. 23

The Supreme Court declared that, by exceeding his powers and flouting the separation of
powers doctrine, the Minister’s selective implementation of section 97 is “unconstitutional and
therefore invalid as a consequence.” 24 Nonetheless, the court decided that the setting aside of
the Minister’s determination and the declaration of constitutional invalidity would only take
place on 21 March 2020, and not on 17 October 2014 when the Minister determined the
commencement of section 97. In postponing the effect of the invalidity order, the court
considered that, though afforded the opportunity to adduce evidence concerning the impact and
timing of the invalidity order, the respondents chose not to do so. 25 In addition, the Court
scheduled the coming into effect of the invalidity order for 21 March 2020 because a
prospective date would not render the order “meaningless”. 26

Based on the above, the Supreme Court found that the applicants had the right to a declaratory
order to the effect that the Minister’s determination violated the Constitution and that the court
had to set it aside. 27 At this point, the Court’s reasoning starts to reveal huge cracks. The Court
reasoned that, because the applicants did not prove that irregularities occurred and that the
absence of a verifiable paper trail had adversely affected their right to vote, particularly with
reference to the irregular use of EVMs or their unreliability. In the end, the Supreme Court
deemed it inappropriate to declare the election invalid and order a rerun of it. 28 In so ruling, the
Court took into account the applicants’ delay in bringing the electoral challenge, 29 they also

21

ibid [74].
ibid.
23
ibid.
24
ibid [76].
25
ibid [106].
26
ibid [108]. In so ruling, the Supreme Court relied on Communications Regulatory Authority of Namibia v
Telecom Namibia Ltd and Another 2018 (3) NR 664 (SC). Hereinafter ‘CRAN’.
27
Itula (n 5) [76].
28
ibid [107].
29
ibid [101]-[105].
22
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factored in their decision the lack of evidence by the applicants concerning the impact and the
timing of any order of invalidity. 30

Significance
Like the court realized, the Itula case involved an “an issue of profound constitutional
importance”. At the same time, lawyers in Namibia will probably remember Itula as one of the
Supreme Court cases that people contested the most.

In particular, for several reasons, jurists will dispute the Supreme Court’s decision to decline
the applicants’ request that the court nullify the 2019 presidential election and order a rerun.
To begin, the court wrongly assumed that the ECN had no duty to prove that the absence of
verifiable paper trail did not adversely affect the election. While the default position in civil
cases holds that he who alleges must prove, the Electoral Act imposes a duty on the ECN to
organize, manage and control the conduct of elections in a credible manner. 31 This duty creates
a positive obligation on the ECN to demonstrate that the elections they conduct are credible.
Given this duty, the default position in civil cases or, in this specific instance, the lack of
evidence regarding the credibility of elections cannot play out in the ECN’s favor. In light of
this, the ECN had to establish that the Namibian people could trust the conduct of the 2019
election, which it could not establish precisely because of the absence of any verifiable paper
trail. On this ground, the court should have invalidated the election.

Second, and considering the point explained immediately above, the Court’s reasoning in Itula
proceeded in a circular fashion. The court refused to invalidate the election because it found
that the applicants failed to show that the absence of paper trail negatively affected the election,
yet the absence of verifiable paper trail is the very reason why the ECN had to prove that people
could trust that election, and not the other way around. In essence, the Court held that the
absence of a paper trail did not affect the election, and to prove that it did not affect the election
the court held that no paper trail exists to verify that effect. And yet the effect of that absence
on the election is precisely what the ECN needs to establish!

30
31

ibid [106].
Electoral Act 5 of 2014, s 3.
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Another way of seeing the Supreme Court’s stance towards the absence of paper trail suggests
that, by denying the applicants the relief they sought, the court merely appealed to people’s
ignorance. An appeal to ignorance works by positing that, because a person cannot prove that
X is false, then X must be true. Applied to Itula, this reasoning insists that, because the
applicants cannot prove that irregularities occurred during the election, then the election must
have taken place free of such irregularities. Appeals to ignorance such as the one used in Itula
poses a major problem: A person cannot draw any conclusion from ignorance or the absence
of evidence. This means that the Supreme Court cannot rely on such ignorance or absence of
evidence to conclude either that the irregularities did not negatively impact the election or that
they did indeed have such a negative impact. This implies that, while the ignorance and the
lack of evidence would not have justified the Court in invalidating the election and ordering a
rerun, they do not justify the Court’s decision to deny the invalidation and the rerun either.

Conclusion
The Itula case puts the Supreme Court at the heart of one of the most contentious cases it had
ever to decide. Although the Supreme Court headed by Shivute scored a lot of points in terms
of independence and effectiveness, people will likely remember Itula as one of the most
controversial in the jurisprudence developed by the Shivute court. Not least because the Court
could not disentangle the concept of “selective implementation” from “selective
promulgation”. 32

The court rightly ruled that it must see the challenge mounted by the applicants “within the
profound constitutional importance of a presidential election, to [sic] the right to vote and the
principle of democracy”. 33 However, the court did not seem to have factored such importance
into their crafting of an appropriate remedy. Article 17(2) of the Constitution entitles every
citizen aged 18 and above to vote – a right that democracy cannot dispense with. Why did the
court not deploy these constitutional values to nullify the election and order a rerun? Instead,

32

See, for example, the court’s interchangeable use of ‘selective promulgation’ [Itula (n 5) [7]-[8]] and ‘selective
implementation’ (ibid [8],[13],[39],[63], and [71]). In the Namibian legal system, the President of the Republic
‘promulgates’ Acts of Parliament whereas a body or a person (often a Minister) designated by a given Act of
Parliament ‘implements’ the provisions of the Act. The designated body or person typically implements the
provisions of the Act by publishing a notice in the Government Gazette to that effect. The body or the person can
thus implement the provisions of the Act entirely or selectively. In that system, government ministers do not
‘promulgate’ Acts; they ‘implement’ them.
33
Itula (n 5) [46].
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the court considered the absence of paper trial and the parties’ delay in launching the
proceedings to deny the applicants’ request.

Did the Supreme Court not undermine the outcome of its own decision regarding the
appropriate remedy when it found that the Minister breached the constitutional principle of
separation of powers? Indeed, the consequence of a declaration of constitutional invalidity is
that the conduct in question becomes a nullity as soon as the actor performed it. By the same
token, after the Supreme Court ruled that the Minister’s selective implementation of section 97
of the Act offended the Constitution, the Court’s ruling had the effect of nullifying selective
implementation.
However, relying on CRAN, 34 the court chose to postpone the invalidity order. The court took
this route notwithstanding the fact that the CRAN precedent only warranted an invalidity order
that operates ex nunc [i.e., ‘from now on’], 35 as opposed to an invalidity order that comes into
operation on a prospective date.

If the court had ruled that selective implementation was null and void from the beginning (i.e.,
from 17 October 2014), section 97 would have entered into force without selection, and the
ECN would have remained bound to use EVMs together with a verifiable paper trail. Thus, the
mere fact that the ECN deployed EVMs without a verifiable paper trail would have made the
conduct of the 2019 election unlawful and illegal.
But the court followed the judgment in CRAN to rule out an ex tunc invalidity order. 36 All the
same, the CRAN case constituted clear authority for issuing an ex nunc invalidity order. The
court should have ordered the ECN to redo the election.

34

CRAN (n 26).
ibid [105]-[106] and [109].
36
When an invalidity order operates ex tunc, it operates “from the beginning”.
35
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